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POWER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY 
Marci A. Hamilton* 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE 
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION. By David Schoenbrod. New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 260. $28.50. 
OORODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution's plan for representative democracy can 
be summarized by this aphorism: hope for the best, but expect -
and plan for - the worst. Framer James Wilson, a principal archi-
tect of the Constitution's scheme of representation,1 most plainly 
captured this seemingly mixed message when he stated that while 
"[g]oodness should inspire and animate the intention [of laws prop-
erly designed and properly framed],"2 a unicameral legislature is 
"impossible to restrain in its operations."3 Good representative 
government is possible, he asserted, but a single legislature may be 
subject to "sudden and violent fits of despotism, injustice, and 
cruelty."4 
Wilson believed that the sovereign people must transfer sub-
stantial power to the representative for government to be efficient 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
B.A. 1979, Vanderbilt University; M.A. English 1982, M.A. Philosophy 1984, Pennsylvania 
State University; J.D. 1988, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I would like to thank Hans 
Linde and Stewart Sterk for their helpful comments on an earlier draft as well as David 
Schoenbrod for his insightful and open-minded comments. Tammy Bieber and Linda Cohen 
provided valuable research assistance. 
1. As one of the major figures of the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson deserves 
more attention than he has received. Legal scholars' almost exclusive reliance on The Feder-
alist Papers, to which James Wilson did not contribute, has led them to neglect Wilson's im-
portant contributions. See Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to 
Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 477, 488 n.41 (1994). I do not offer Wilson's views on representation for the purpose of 
advancing an originalist agenda. Rather, his concepts, in the history of ideas on representa-
tive democracy, stand out as having strong explanatory and justificatory powers for the 
American representative system. 
2. James Wilson, Lectures on Law: Of government [hereinafter Wilson, Of government], 
in 1 THE WoRKs OF JAMES WILSON 284, 290 (Robert G. Mccloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter 
WoRKS). 
3. Id. at 291. 
4. Id. 
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and successful.5 Although he strongly believed that popular sover-
eignty must be the philosophical source of representative democ-
racy, he believed with equal conviction that the people must 
transfer actual lawmaking authority to others. History, he under-
stood, teaches that this transfer of power creates the possibility -
though not the necessity- of tyranny. Liberty requires represent-
atives who can and will serve the people rather than oppress them. 
To explain the capacities of the representative, Wilson forged a 
theory of the synthesis of the will and the understanding. Repre-
sentatives can serve, according to WilSon, because man is not 
merely a self-serving will. Rather, will is always intertwined with 
understanding or knowledge, which can take the representative be-
yond simple self-service into a relationship of trust with his constit-
uents.6 Representatives will serve - i.e., resist the temptation to 
tyrannize - because the Constitution, and the people, will check 
their attempts to stray beyond the boundaries of their powers.1 
Constitutional limits on a representative's power such as a bicam-
eral legislature, the enumeration of powers, the separation of pow-
ers, limited terms of power, and regular elections were crafted to 
minimize the chances for positions of power to corrupt legislators 
and to facilitate opportunities for representatives to act in the best 
interests of their constituents. 
The necessity of delegating broad power to representatives 
stood at the foundation of Wilson's theory of democratic govern-
ment. The concepts of understanding and will further shaped his 
specific model of representation, a model largely adopted by the 
Convention. Contemporary discourse on representation generally 
focuses on the latter two of the three notions Wilson laid down, 
neglecting the foundation of the Constitution's scheme of represen-
tation - the inevitability and necessity of independent legislative 
responsibility.s Civic republicans tend to emphasize the representa-
tive's capacity for understanding and wisdom while public choice 
theorists emphasize the representative's self-serving will.9 
5. James Wilson, Speech on choosing the members of the senate by electors; delivered on 
31st December, 1789, in the convention of Pennsylvania [hereinafter Wilson, Speech on De-
cember 31, 1789], in 2 WoRKS, supra note 2, at 781, 791. 
6. See James Wilson, Lectures on Law: Of man, as an individual, in 1 WORKS, supra note 
2, at 197, 199. 
7. See, e.g., Wilson, Of government, supra note 2, at 289-90; Wilson, Speech on December 
31, 1789, supra note 5, at 792. 
8. Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 
709, 719 (1994) ("A common fallacy confuses the framers' principle of popular sovereignty, 
the principle that legitimate power must be derived from the governed, with its exercise 
through unmediated direct lawmaking."). 
9. Compare Abner J. Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 14 
VA. L REv. 167, 167 (1988) (describing public choice theorists' vision of legislators as " 'rent-
seeking' egoist[s]") with Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. 
L REv. 29, 57 (1985) (depicting the representative's role under the classic republican concep-
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Although the debate between or about public choice theory and 
civic republicanism has been valuable, its dichotomous nature has 
impoverished discourse on authority and power. The Constitution's 
design to lilliit the power of the representative for the sake of the 
people has gained such ascendancy in political and legal theory that 
self-rule or self-government has co:qie to be mistaken as the touch-
stone for our constitutional scheme.1° Concomitantly, leadership, 
responsibility, and power, which were at the center of the Framers' 
- especially Wilson's - conception of representation have be-
come quasi-taboo subjects.11 
Although the Framers decidedly did not endorse a scheme of 
self-rule or direct lawmaking,12 and instead single-mindedly at-
tempted to craft the best possible scheme of republican democracy, 
self-rule has become the implicit value underlying much of the cur-
rent debate over the legislative process.13 A wide array of legal 
scholars has attempted to turn the representative process into one 
that approximates self-rule through various .schemes of judicial re-
view.14 The literature reads as though it would deny the fundamen-
tal premise of representation - that real power is transferred from 
the people to their representatives. Such denial cloaks the reality 
that those who govern are truly distinct from the govemed.15 Dur-
ing the term of representation, self-rule on matters of public import 
is subordinated to the goals of efficiency and efficacy. The nostalgic 
ti~n as one that "deliberate[s] on the public good," not one that "mechanically [responds] to 
existing social conceptions"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term 
- Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 15-16 (1984) 
(describing the purpose of the legislative process as an aggregation of preferences - a bar-
gain between the legislature and interes,t groups); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: 
Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 36-37 
(1991) (arguing that the pursuit of self-interest is opposed by the altruistic norm). 
10. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 493-95. See id. at 479 & n.2 for a definition of "self-rule." 
11. See, e.g., Wtlson, Speech on December 31, 1789, ~upra note 5, at 783-93. 
12. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522-25 
(1990) (noting that the Framers' fear of tyranny by the majority resulted in constitutional 
limits on majority preferences that are absent in direct democracy). 
13. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 494-95. 
14. Id. at 502-19. 
15. The colonial generation plainly understood this core aspect of representation. The 
Declaration of Independence, which was intended to reject the British rule definitively, did 
not reject the necessity of a government distinct from the people, but rather explicitly recog-
nized the distinction between those who govern and those who are governed: "Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... " 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). In 1787, Benjamin Rush elabo-
rated upon the point as follows: 
It is often said that "the sovereign and all other power is seated in the people." This idea 
is unhappily expressed. It should be - "all power is derived from the people." They 
possess it only on the days of their elections. After this, it is the property of their rulers, 
nor can they exercise it or resume it, unless it is abused. 
GORDON S. Wooo, THE CREATION OF nm AMERICAN REPUBUc, 1776-1787, at 373-74 
(1969) (citation omitted). James Wtlson also emphasized this point. See Hamilton, supra 
note 1, at 530-32; infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text. 
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turn toward self-rule permeates the literature even in the face of an 
enormous and ever-more complex society for which comprehensive 
self-rule can be no option. This nostalgia flies in the face of the 
Framers' conscious rejection of direct lawmaking and of their con-
scientious attempts to craft a republican form of government on 
both the federal and - through the Guarantee Clause - the state 
levels.16 
David Schoenbrod's book, Power Without Responsibility: How 
Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation,11 goes a long way 
toward vigorously reintroducing the subject of legislative responsi-
bility into the discourse on representation. His central theme is that 
representatives have a constitutional duty to make policy choices 
and that therefore delegation of that duty to administrative agen-
cies is unconstitutional. His goal is to craft a feasible means by 
which the Supreme Court can revive its :flagging nondelegation doc-
trine (Chapters One, Nine, and 1\velve), a project for which I have 
already expressed support.18 In this review, I will take a different 
tack and focus on the philosophical underpinnings of his more prag-
matic project. As a result of misplaced emphasis, Schoenbrod ap-
pears to bring together the two sides of the cognitive dissonance 
that attends the current debate over representation without recon-
ciling them. On the one hand, he seems to speak from the side of 
the civic republicans and condemns representatives for failing to 
shoulder the difficult and demanding decisionmaking responsibili-
ties entrusted to them (pp. 10-12, 14, 20-21, 58-59, 72-75, 102-05). 
He accuses them of taking the self-interested route rather than the 
altruistic or empathetic route (pp. 20-21, 46, 102). On the other 
hand, much of the book is devoted to empirical examples of repre-
sentatives failing to be virtuous.19 Thus Schoenbrod sets a high 
standard by which to judge a representative, . but then leaves the 
impression that this standard is not likely to be attainable. Yet, his 
theory of nondelegation does not deserve to be ignored but rather 
requires adjustment. 
In a nutshell, representation rests upon a voluntary delegation 
of power from the people to their· chosen representatives. Hope 
and high expectations are necessary adjuncts to such a scheme. As 
Wilson eloquently stated: 
When I reflect, that the laws which are to be made may affect my own 
life, my own liberty, my own property, and the lives, liberties, proper-
ties, and prospects of others likewise, who are dearest to me, I con-
16. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government .... "); see Eule, supra note 12. 
17. David Schoenbrod is Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
18. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 551-54. 
19. Chapter 2 is entitled "The Vain Search for Virtuous Lawmakers." 
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sider the trust, which I place in those for whom I vote to be 
legislators, as the greatest that one man can, in the course of the busi-
ness of life, repose in another .... I console myself, that the same 
trust, which is committed by me, is also committed by others, who are 
as deeply interested in its exercise as I am.20 
Rather than tending toward an either-or stand on virtue, Schoen-
brod should have focused more on the grant of power from the 
public to its representatives and, in particular, the implicitly opti-
mistic chord strm;:k by such a voluntary and broad delegation. At 
the same time, and to justify his argument for constitutional limits 
on the representatives' exercise of their delegated authority, he 
should have contemplated the dangers attending such a delegation 
of power. In the absence of such a two-pronged analysis, his high 
expectations for representatives seem unrealistic and even unfair, 
and his argument that the Court should provide incentives for re-
sponsible behavior seems futile. The constitutional system is prop-
erly understood as a synthesis of high expectations and realistic 
hedging. One loses the fullness of the Constitution's scheme for 
representation by insisting that either one is more important or nec-
essary than the other. 
Schoenbrod's central thesis is that Congress has shirked its con-
stitutionally mandated responsibility to make the hard policy 
choices. To counter the imminent objection that Congress can do 
no more work than it is already doing, he suggests that there are a 
number of governing decisions that might be better made by the 
state and local governments. He fails, however, to explain how or 
why local decisionmaking would be preferable to national decision-
making. Given his devotion to the desirability of responsible repre-
sentation, one might have expected him to express reservations 
about the delegation of such powers at the state level and to have 
explored the contemporary phenomenon of direct lawmaking that 
displaces representative lawmaking through direct initiatives. 
In Parts I and II of this review, I rely upon the views of James 
Wilson - which provide both guidance and support for Schoen-
brod's project - to illuminate both of these issues: the relationship 
between virtue and power and the desirability and pitfalls of direct 
lawmaking. In Part III, I contrast Schoenbrod's proposals with the 
views of Jiirgen Habermas, a contempqrary political philosopher 
and the author of Between Facis and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. 21 Both Schoenbrod and 
Habermas respond to the development of the administrative state. 
The differences and similarities between their respective responses 
20. Wilson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 782. 
21. JORGEN flABERMAS, BETWEEN FACI'S AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., forthcoming 1995) (manu-
script on file with author). 
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signal the contemporary fork in the road facing representative dem-
ocratic theory. 
I. VIRTUE AND POWER 
Using concrete examples of Congress's delegation of its deci-
sionmaking authority to executive agencies, Schoenbrod argues that 
Congress has breached its constitutional obligation to make "the 
hard policy choices" far too often (pp. 4-9, 38, 49-55). He urges the 
Supreme Court to invalidate legislation that results from congres-
sional shirking of its decisionmaking responsibilities (Chapters Ten 
to 1\velve ). 
Schoenbrod is opposed to the delegation of policy choices to the 
executive branch because delegation frustrates accountability, 
thereby endangering liberty (Chapters Six and Seven). Legislators 
who delegate their substantive policy choices to the administration 
can take public stands that are popular but that do not solve the 
particular problem posed. The public is mollified by the stand 
taken, leaving the administration to work on the problem in relative 
obscurity. In essence, delegation short-circuits the communication 
pathway between representatives and their constituents that is nec-
essary to limit legislators' exercise of their power.22 
A tension at the base of Schoenbrod's theory, however, calls 
into question the entire edifice. On the one hand, he repeatedly 
faults Congress for failing to shoulder its burden to make hard pol-
icy decisions.23 Representatives should, on his terms, engage their 
best judgment to solve the difficult and complex national problems 
facing the country. Such high expectations of representatives tacitly 
require a belief in the. capacity of individuals to do good on behalf 
of those they represent. On the other hand, his emphasis on factual 
examples of congressional failure and his rhetoric seem to discount 
the possibility of such an authentic relationship of trust: "The en-
during hope for public virtue is understandable but childish. Most 
individuals have enough trouble truly loving those with whom they 
are intimate, so that truly loving tjie public seems unlikely. We 
should choose our means of making law without listening to protes-
22. James Wtlson espoused this view. See, e.g., James Wtlson, Speech delivered on 26th 
November; 17f!:/ [hereinafterWtlson, Speech on November26, 1787], in 2 WoRKS,supranote 
2, at 759, 763-64. . 
23. See p. 4 ("[D]elegation shields Congress and the president from blame for harming 
their constituents"); p. 8 ("Delegation allows our elected lawmakers to disclaim any responsi-
bility for harm done to consumers."); p. 10 ("Congress ducks the key conflicts."); p. 12 
("[D]elegation renders [representatives] less responsible to the people and less responsive to 
their interests."); p. 14 (Delegation permits "lawmakers to hide behind unelected agency 
officials."); p. 105 ("Delegation allows the president to avoid personal involvement in law-
making."); p. 139 ("The reason for a federal law on asbestos in the schools is to enable our 
elected lawmakers to strike a pose in' favor of children's health without having to take the 
blame for the great bulk of the cleanup cost."). 
May 1995] Republican Democracy 1545 
tations of virtue."24 This apparent concession to public choice the-
ory robs his theory of the philosophical basis necessary to justify his 
call to responsibility. If virtue is irrelevant, or impossible to expect, 
then the "means of making law" are nothing more than machinery 
attached to dysfunctional operators. 
Acknowledging that humans have the capacity to act honorably 
in the best interests of others is absolutely essential to a theory of 
representation based upon the presumption that representatives 
serve the represented. Empathy, altruism, and a measure of objec-
tivity are indispensable qualities for a representative. If individuals 
cannot be expected to have these traits, then criticizing representa-
tives for their lack of responsibility is wasted breath. In a world 
without the possibility of virtue, the representative's standard of 
care should be correspondingly low or a representative system 
ought to be scrapped altogether. 
Schoenbrod's focus upon empirical examples of virtue unreal-
ized take~ his argument away from the most important element of 
his thesis, a theme adverted to in the title of the book and intimated 
in his call to representatives to mcike policy choices but never di-
rectly addressed: the element of power. Rather than taking on the 
theme of virtue, a capacity that must be presumed in order to justify 
his exhortations to responsibility, he would do better to wrestle 
with this underexamined aspect of the representative relationship. 
Absent a delegation of power virtually irrevocable for the term of 
office, there is no need to exhort representatives to act responsibly, 
no need for the Constitution's scheme to limit the exercise of the 
representative's power, and no need for the Supreme Court to 
check the legislators' exercise of their power through the nondele-
gation doctrine, which is the heart of Schoenbrod's ·proposal. It is 
the scope of legislative power that justifies Schoenbrod's concern 
about representative trustworthiness, not a necessary lack of virtue. 
Under the constitutional design, and by means of free elections, 
the people delegate to chosen representatives the power to make 
binding decisions about every permissible_ subject of public life dur-
ing the term of office. Although those representatives are account-
able in the American system through the mechanisms of the First 
Amendment and the electoral process, once elected they hold the 
power to make the law independent of the people.25 Wilson char-
acterized the power given to representatives as necessarily broad in 
order to achieve an efficient and successful state.26 "The Framers 
24. P. 46; see also p. 26 {"I proceed on the premise that public officials •.. are unlikely to 
be more virtuous than the rest of us."); p. 27 (noting that the Constitution is designed to 
"protect individual liberty from the people's lack of virtue"). 
25. See generally Hamilton, supra note 1. 
26. Wilson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 791. 
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rejected direct lawmaking - in which decisionmaking power over 
public issues remains with the people - because they believed it to 
be unworkable.27 As Schoenbrod rightly notes, one of the charges 
to the Constitutional Convention was to craft a system of govern-
ment "better able to meet national needs than that created by the 
Articles of Confederation."28 
The necessary power transfer creates a chasm between the peo-
ple and their representatives.29 It creates the opportunity for repre-
sentatives to abuse such power, and therefore to oppress the 
people. Representatives must have the capacity to be virtuous to 
make the representative system worthwhile, but the institution of a 
system of representation immediately poses a choice between fulfil-
ling the trust relationship set up by the constitutional design and 
abusing the substantial degree of power delegated. Schoenbrod 
correctly reads in the constitutional design a call to responsibility 
that is directed precisely at the moment when representation comes 
into being. The responsibility arises because real power has 
changed hands. 
The desire for efficient and good government, implicit in the 
constitutional structure, and the necessity of delegating decision-
making responsibility to a small number of citizens justify Schoen-
brod's charge to representatives to "make the hard policy choices" 
(pp. 10-12, 14, 17, 19, 58-59, 72-75, 102-05). Representatives can be 
held to a high standard of virtue because virtue is possible, but we 
still can be suspicious of their actions, because they are delegated 
such broad powers. It is misleading, therefore, to permit oneself to 
be forced to choose between self-interest and virtue as models of 
human behavior if one is to understand the Constitution's scheme 
of representation. Neither one adequately could account for the 
system of representation contemplated by the Constitution. Were 
virtue a guaranteed quality, the Constitution's thoroughgoing suspi-
cion of those in power would be superfluous, and its mechanisms to 
check the exercise of power would be bars to efficiency. Were self-
interest the only motivating force for human existence, the Consti-
tution's scheme for the delegation of broad and expansive powers 
would be foolhardy. Only in a world where both virtue and self-
interest are immanent does it make sense to craft a representative 
democratic system wherein the people simultaneously delegate 
broad power and employ as many means as necessary to check its 
exercise. 
27. Wtlson, Speech on November 26, 1787, supra note 22, at 771-72. 
28. P. 27; see also Wtlson, Speech on November 26, 1787, supra note 22, at 769. 
29. Cf. Eule, supra note 12, at 1514 ("The gap between the will of the majority and the 
voice of the legislature, it turns out, is there by constitutional design."). 
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Schoenbrod's call to legislative responsibility is both apropos 
and important. The cognitive dissonance in his explanation of the 
foundation of his theory is not fatal. Rather, it requires a shift in 
emphasis and movement from the dichotomous debate created by 
the coexistence of the public choice and civic republican theories to 
a vision of how virtue and selfishness can interplay in a healthier 
lawmaking system. 
IJ. REPRESENTATION IN THE STATES 
Schoenbrod emphasizes federal representatives' duty to make 
hard policy choices and argues that their failure of responsibility is 
of constitutional magnitude. He acknowledges, however, that his 
theory increases the workload of an already burdened Congress. 
His proffered remedy is to relieve the national legislature of its na-
tional policymaking responsibilities on particular issues and to shift 
the locus of decisionmaking back to the state and local govern-
ments. He does not explain, however, how shifting the locus of 
decisionmaking to the states serves the people's interest in being 
truly served by their representatives (pp. 136-37). Shifting decision-
making responsibility to the states from the federal government 
does not necessarily cure the problem of abusive delegation. 
Rather, it simply changes the geographical context. Delegation is 
as much a problem at the state level as it is at the federal: indeed, 
some state constitutions delegate legislative decisionmaking respon-
sibilities to administrative agencies, and even ba~k to the voters 
themselves. 30 
Havmg taken the tack of resorting to state decisionmaking to 
render his theory of congressional responsibility feasible, Schoen-
brod then fails to grapple with one of the most iritriguing and un-
derexamined constitutional issues in contemporary America - the 
constitutionality of popular initiative or referendum lawmaking. 
The Guarantee Clause states that the "United States shall guaran-
tee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govem-
ment."31 Popular lawmaking undermines the republican, or 
representative, form of govemment.32 While the issue has not been 
completely ignored,33 it has yet to receive widespread attention and 
30. State constitutions delegate authority back to the voters by reserving to the people 
the initiative and referendum powers, see, e.g., Aruz. CoNST., art. IV, pt 1, § 1; CAL. CONST., 
art. IV,§ 1; OR. CONST., art. IV,§ 1; WASH. CoNST., art. II,§ 1, or by reserving the people's 
right to instruct their representatives and petition the legislature for redress, see, e.g., CAL. 
CONST., art. I, § 3; FLA. CoNST., art. I, § 5; IND. CoNST., art. I, § 31; MAss. CoNST., pt 1, art. 
XIX, § 20; VT. CoNST., ch. 1, art. XX. 
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
32. See Eule, supra note 12, at 1545. 
33. See generally Eule, supra note 12; Hans A. Linde, Due Process 'Of Lawmaking, 55 
NEB. L. REv. 197 {1976); Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking not "Republican 
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has not sparked a significant amount of debate among legal aca-
demics. This is a remarkable lacuna in contemporary discourse 
given the prevalence of popular lawmaking in the states34 and the 
interest in civic republicanism. 
James Wilson's statements regarding the Guarantee Clause pro-
vide a cogent framework within which to consider the issue of 
whether the Constitution permits the states to bypass legislative 
decisionmaking in favor of popular decisionmaking.3s If the consti-
tutional argument against popular lawmaking is strong enough, 
then it suggests two conclusions about Schoenbrod's project. First, 
his shifting of decisionmaking responsibility to the states must be 
limited to a shifting of subject matter, not the means of decision-
making. Second, his modeling of legislative responsibility may have 
application well beyond the confiri.es of Congress to the state 
governments. 
Wtlson made two explicit references to the Guarantee Clause in 
his lectures on law.36 The lectures were delivered after the Consti-
tutional Convention and should be considered in the same vein as 
The Federalist Papers, that is, as an attempt by one who was a major 
force during the Convention to explain and justify the grand consti-
tutional scheme and each of its parts.37 Neither of Wilson's re-
marks on the Guarantee Clause provides positive proof that he 
believed that direct lawmaking was inappropriate for the states. 
These remarks, however, when read together with his writings on 
representation in general,38 strongly indicate that he did not sup-
port direct democracy for the states. 
His lecture entitled Of man, as a member of a confederation39 
strongly implies that state republican governments should reflect 
Government"?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law-
making is not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. 
REv. 19 (1993); Linde, supra note 8; Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional 
Law: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 709 (1994); 
Symposium, Governing by Initiative, 66 U. CoLO. L. REv. 13 (1995); Thomas C. Berg, Com-
ment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 208 (1987); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desira-
bility and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988); Com-
ment, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1143 
(1979). 
34. See Eule, supra note 12, at 1509 n.22, 1510 nn.23-25, app. A. 
35. Julian Eule has already delineated James Madison's views in some detail, implicitly 
concluding that direct democracy is contrary to the constitutional scheme of government and 
the Guarantee Clause, though he has avoided taking an explicit stand on the constitutionality 
of popular lawmaking measures. See id. 
36. James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 1 WoRKS, supra note 2, at 67. 
37. See CHAru.Es PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON 221-55 (1956). 
38. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson's views on 
representation). 
39. James \Vtlson, Lectures on Law: Of man, as a member of a confederation [hereinaf-
ter Wiison, Man as a member], in 1 WoRKS, supra note 2, at 247. 
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the federal republican scheme embodied in the Constitution: "A 
confederate republick should consist of states, whose government is 
of the same nature; and it is proper that their government should be 
of the republican kind."40 Granted, Wilson's declaration in favor of 
a republican form of state government was not presented as a repu-
diation of direct lawmaking, but rather as a repudiation of the no- . 
tion that particular states should be permitted to establish separate 
monarchies.41 Yet, his larger discussion indicates that his theory of 
republican government was not only a rejection of monarchical 
government.42 Wtlson explicitly expects that state governments will 
be similar. He does not demand of them "precise and exact uni-
formity in all their particular establishments and laws,"43 but "the 
fundamental principles of their laws and constitutions [should] be 
consistent and congenial."44 The similarity Wilson envisions be-
tween the various state governments requires some restraint on 
their choice of government - namely, the essentials of republican 
government found in the federal scheme and echoed in the Guaran-
tee Clause. It counsels against the legitimacy of direct lawmaking. 
Wilson also draws a parallel between the Constitution's federal 
form of republican government and the expected forms of state 
governments when, in a later lecture, entitled, Of the constitutions 
of the United States and of Pennsylvania - Of the legislative depart-
ment, 45 he states that the "national government ... has embarked 
itself on the same bottom with the governments of the different 
states. "46 He characterizes the Guarantee Clause as a "political ne-
cessity, "47 because it aligns the potentially antagonistic govern-
ments of the nation and the states by placing them "on the same 
bottom."48 For him, the unity of the country and the republican 
nature of the national government "depends on" the states' forms 
of republican government.49 
The provision for twin republican governments in the states and 
the federal government, Wtlson argues, proves the national govern-
40. Id. at 264. 
41. Id. 
42. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 
CoLO. L. REv. 849, 868 (1994) ("There is no doubt that a 'republican government' - both 
from the perspective of the framers and its contemporary desirable content - includes more 
than just protection from monarchical governments."). 
43. Wiison, Man as a member, supra note 39, at 264. 
44. Id. at 264-65. 
45. James Wilson, Lectures on Law: · Of the constitutions of the United States and of 
Pennsylvania - Of the legislative department [hereinafter Wiison, Legislative department], 
in 1 WORKS, supra note 2, at 399. 
46. Id. at 407. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. ("Its own existence, as a government of this description, depends on theirs."). 
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ment's "determination to sink or swim with th[e states]."50 The 
sink-or-swim metaphor is a telling one. Wilson believed that the 
Constitutional Convention had crafted a new form of representa-
tive government, one that had never before been conceived or at-
tempted.51 The Federal Constitution's scheme for a republican 
form of government was a grand experiment, one for which Wilson 
had great hopes. It was a form of government that carried within it 
the rejection of ancient direct democracies, monarchies, and aris-
tocracies, and expanded upon the less comprehensive forms of rep-
resentation found, for example, in Britain.52 Although Wilson 
never directly says it, it seems reasonable to conclude - given his 
insistence that the states develop similar forms of government, his 
support for the "republican form of government" language in the 
Guarantee Clause, and his comparison between the federal govern-
ment and the states' republican forms of government -, that he 
expected the states to replicate to a significant degree the federal 
experiment in republican democracy. As opposed to direct democ-
racy, Wilson believed that republican democracy on the state level 
would result in uniformity, national unity, and efficiency. 
A speech that Wilson made in 1789,53 when read in conjunction 
with his endorsement of a republican form of state government in 
Of man, as a member of a confederation, supports my tentative con-
clusion that Wilson, in favoring a republican form of government, 
meant to exclude forms of direct lawmaking. Although Wilson may 
not have been opposed to direct democracy per se, he believed that 
it would not promote efficiency and freedom in any state in which 
the people were too numerous to assemble for delibera,tion on the 
particular issues, a situation he apparently attributed to every 
American state in existence at the end of the eighteenth century. 
More than once, and again in a 1789 speech, Wilson made the point 
that the delegation of decisionmaking power should occur only 
when it is a necessity.54 The circumstance giving rise to the neces-
sity of delegation is the fact that the citizens "can neither assemble 
nor deliberate together in one place."55 Direct lawmaking is ac-
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 402; Wilson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 783. 
52. James Wilson, Comparison of the constitution of the United States, with that of Great 
Britain [hereinafter Wilson, Comparison of the constitution], in 1 Woru<s, supra note 2, at 
311; Wilson, Legislative department, supra note 45, at 405; Wilson, Speech on November 26, 
1787, supra note 22, at 762-63; Wtlson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 783. 
53. Wilson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 781. 
54. Id. at 782 {"When I am called upon to appoint other persons to make laws for me, I 
do it because such an appointment is of absolute necessity."); see also Wilson, Legislative 
department, supra note 45, at 405. 
55. Wilson, Speech on December 31, 1789, supra note 5, at 782; Wilson, Legislative de-
partment, supra note 45, at 405 ("[I]n large states, the people cannot assemble together. As 
they cannot, therefore, act by themselves, they must act by their representatives."). 
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ceptable to Wilson only in a state in which the people can assemble 
and deliberate face-to-face, as in particular governments of ancient 
Greece or Rome or Germany.56 Moreover, he presumes that in 
large republics, representatives will likely have more information 
on issues of public governance than do the people, who cannot con-
vene to hear evidence or discuss problems.s1 The impossibility of 
assembly, which contributes to an information differential between 
the people and their representatives, thus supports republican deci-
sionmaking rather than direct lawmaking at the state level. From 
Wilson's perspective, therefore, it would appear that popular 
lawmaking that displaces legislative decisionmaking would be 
unconstitutional. 
The policy reasons against direct lawmaking are also strong. 
First, because only a portion of the overall population participates 
in the voting process, the final decisions singlehandedly reached· by 
this subgroup may not accurately reflect the preferences of the ma-
jority of the citizenry, assuming they had formed such prefer-
ences.58 Unlike the representative system in which legislators are 
required to vote on every proposed law, a direct lawmaking system 
permits voters to vote anonymously and thereby to select certain 
issues upon which to exercise their decisionmaking privilege.s9 Ad-
ditionally, because many issues are complex and intertwined with 
other issues, and because citizens have many obligations beyond 
their civic responsibilities, much of the general population may lack 
the knowledge and ability to cast an informed vote, and may 
thereby misunderstand the significance of their votes.6° Such voter 
confusion, which can be alleviated in the representative system 
through debate and deliberation, increases the potential for results 
that do not serve the public's interest. The large number of people 
involved in direct lawmaking in the states frequently precludes dis-
course and limits the ability to refine and redefine issues, creating 
the possibility of individually coherent choices becoming collec-
tively incoherent.61 Unlike the collective consensus that can be 
reached at the end of legislative debate and deliberation,62 popular 
56. Wilson, Legislative department, supra note 45, at 405. 
57. Cf. id. at 406 ("[R]epresentatives should express the same sentiments, which the rep-
resented, if possessed of equal information, would express.") (emphasis added). 
58. See Eule, supra note 12, at 1514. 
59. Id. at 1555-56; Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking not "Republican Government"?, 
supra note 33, at 169. 
60. Eule, supra note 12, at 1516; Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking not "Republican 
Government"?, supra note 33, at 169. 
61. Eule, supra note 12, at 1519 n.60; Linde, supra note 8, at 721 (describing shortcomings 
of direct lawmaking systems). 
62. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 484 (quoting Carl Schmitt's discussion of true parliamen-
tary deliberation). 
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lawmaking achieved through anonymous voting results in little 
more than an aggregation of conflicting preferences. Finally, initia-
tive ballots, which are cast anonymously and in private, invite citi-
zens to vote according to their personal self-interest.63 Unlike a 
representative, whose substantive votes are matters of public record 
and whose votes carry consequences such as public criticism and 
reelection implications, a citizen voting on a state initiative is not 
required to justify her decision in light of the public interest. In 
short, because of the many obligations citizens have beyond public 
engagement and due to the sheer number of citizens involved, di-
rect lawmaking does not lead to satisfactory or legitimate results. It 
simply does not serve the tandem constitutional values of effective 
government and safeguarded individual liberties. 
If the Constitution does require republican forms of lawmaking, 
and if, as a policy matter, representation is a better means to effec-
tive, efficient, and successful government than is direct lawmaking, 
two conclusions follow. First, Schoenbrod's suggestion that the fed-
eral government can lighten its workload by letting the states de-
cide more issues requires significant elaboration. If the federal 
government and the states share the work of government, it cannot 
be because one form of government employs more self-rule than 
the other. Both rely on republican forms.of government, with their 
peculiar mix of deep responsibility and the temptation to inappro-
priate delegation. If there is to be a division of responsibilities be-
tween the states and the federal government, it must occur on areas 
of subject matter. Were the nondelegation doctrine revived, a rein-
vigorated enumerated powers doctrine limiting the scope of Con-
gress's authority under Article I and the Civil War Amendments 
could lighten Congress's burden and focus its attention on the hard 
policy choices. The Court recently took a step in this direction with 
its decision in United States v. Lopez. 64 
Second, and to his credit, Schoenbrod's project is not merely a 
project properly limited to Congress. Rather, his subject - legisla-
tive responsibility - applies to state government as well. Once the 
patina of romanticism has been rubbed off direct lawmaking, one 
can more critically investigate popular initiatives, which often per-
mit state representatives to avoid making the hard policy choices 
themselves. Popular initiatives can be to state representatives what 
delegation is to federal representatives. Thus, Schoenbrod's repre-
63. Linde, supra note 8, at 725 (stating that an initiative "invites voters to legislate for 
their own financial self·interest at will"). 
64. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) {holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, § 1702{bl), 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990) {codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 
1993)), exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and involves a subject more 
properly addressed by the states). 
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sentation theory may hold promise for the constitutional examina-
tion of state lawmaking. 
ill.- SCHOENBROD AND liABERMAS: Two REsPONSES TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Many in the American legal academy have sought to downplay 
the legislator's substantial power, to devalue the representative's 
active role made necessary by a republican form of democracy, and 
to fill the concomitant power void with proposals to increase citizen 
participation and decisionmaking authority vis-a-vis the legisla-
ture.65 Jiirgen Habermas extends this trend with his recently pub-
lished and philosophically sophisticated book detailing his 
"discourse theory of democracy."66 Others have sought to explicate 
aspects of Habermas's multifaceted theory.67 For purposes of this 
review, I will limit my comments regarding Habermas's theory to 
those elements of his thesis that merit comparison with Schoen-
brod's project. 
Both Schoenbrod and Habermas are fundamentally concerned 
with democratic theory, and both craft their theses in response to 
the burgeoning administrative state. They both believe that a state 
dominated by an administrative bureaucracy cannot, under existing 
conditions, fulfill democracy's promise of liberty and accountabil-
ity. 68 Schoenbrod sees in the administrative state a shift in govern-
mental power that takes government even further from the people 
than does the system of legislative representation. Although he 
seems to harbor a sentiment in favor of direct democracy - at least 
at the state level - he endorses a federal system of representation 
as a feasible means to liberty. Tracing the Supreme Court's delega-
tion jurisprudence to prove that at one time the Court's nondelega-
tion doctrine was more in tune with the ideal of liberty than it is 
now (pp. 33-46), Schoenbrod does not hearken back to a "heyday" 
of representation, but rather charts a practical course for the con-
temporary Court to follow to invigorate its nondelegation doctrine 
without sending Capitol Hill into chaos (Chapters Nine and 
1\velve ). In short, he would replace the administrative state with a 
legislative-executive state animated by the principles of service, re-
sponsibility, and accountability for the purpose of serving the goal 
of maximum individual liberty. 
65. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 502-19. 
66. See generally Habennas, supra note 21. 
67. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridgi_ng the Gap Between Democracy 
and Rights, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1163 {1995) (reviewing Habennas, supra note 21). 
68. See supra text accompanying note 22 (discussing Schoenbrod's theory that adminis-
trative delegation undennines liberty and accountability); Habennas, supra note 21, at ch. 9. 
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Habermas, on the other hand, treats the administrative state as 
ineradicable and argues for a new paradigm of democracy that 
would favor inclusiveness and comprehensive public decisionmak-
ing. A properly functioning democracy, on his terms, guarantees 
individual liberty and social equality. 1\vo preceding models of de-
mocracy did not properly serve these two goals: free market capi-
talism led to wealth redistribution that increased inequities, and the 
social welfare paradigm that followed it operated under the concept 
of equality but robbed individuals of the capacity to achieve lib-
erty.69 Habermas's new paradigm - the discourse paradigm -
unites liberty and equality by testing the results of democratic 
processes according to the following formula: "Only those norms 
of action are valid to which all possibly affected persons could as-
sent as participants in rational discourses. "70 Central to this con-
ceptualization is his contention that government actions taken in 
the administrative state can be validated on democratic grounds 
only if there is an identity between the law's "addressees" and its 
"authors. "71 
Schoenbrod's and Habermas's approaches partially overlap. 
Schoenbrod's occasional and implicit resort to preference aggrega-
tion to overcome the problems presented by representation and 
Habermas's assent formula both testify to the pull of the self-rule 
ideal.72 At another level, however, Schoenbrod's and Habermas's 
approaches are radically different. Schoenbrod accepts as a given 
the necessity of representation and would not judge the quality of 
representation according to whether, hypothetically, the people 
would have assented to the same decision. Instead, he would have 
the Supreme Court judge the legislators' decisions according to 
whether the legislators embraced the hard task given them. If they 
fulfilled their appointed role, then the results of their efforts should 
stand (pp. 155-91). 
More than any other contemporary democratic theorist cap-
tured by the self-rule ideal, Habermas acknowledges the important 
notion that representatives have power that the public does not.73 
Like so many others before him, however, and like Schoenbrod, he 
elides the power issue to a significant degree. Despite his conces-
sion regarding the relevant power between government officials 
69. Habennas, supra note 21, at ch. 9, pp. 27-30. 
70. Id. at postscript, p. 19. To a significant degree, Habennas's fonnula is actually 
Rawls's original position modified to accommodate the presence of a community of thinkers 
rather than a lone figure. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-22 {1971). 
71. Habennas, supra note 21, at ch. 9, pp. 28-29. 
72. James Wiison also advocated the ancient practice of direct lawmaking where possible. 
See Wiison, Legislative department, supra note 45, at 405. But he saw little scope for such a 
scheme in the American system. Id. 
73. See Habermas, supra note 21, at ch. 7, p. 55; ch. 8, pp. 35, 44, 46, 57-58. 
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and citizens, Habermas would judge law according to whether one 
could construct - out of his counterfactual requiring universal as-
sent to the government's decision - an equation between the law's 
addressees and its authors. Having acceded to the fact that there is 
a power differential between the "public sphere" and the govern-
ment's decisionmaking bodies, he holds fast to the possibility of 
erasing the power divide. He claims to have found the bridge be-
tween addressee-ship and authorship in particular instances of in-
tersubjective, public discourse: 
I would like to render plausible the claim that under certain circum-
stances civil society c.an acquire influence in the public sphere, have an 
effect on the parliamentary complex {and the courts) via public opin-
ions of its own, and compel the political system to coJ;i.vert to the offi-
cial circulation of power.74 
He acknowledges, however, an unbridgeable gap between discourse 
and authorship, a term that adds linguistic gloss to what he really 
means: decisionmaking power. In attempting to ameliorate the 
brute fact that this gap exists, he idealizes the structure and function 
of discourse. In effect, he asks of discourse what it cannot provide: 
a definitive decision. 
As Professor Michel Rosenfeld has noted, Habermas's 
counterfactual proposition breaks down in the face of social 
problems over which there is deep and principled disagreement -
in situations in which action cannot be taken without a decision that 
is at least partially arbitrary.75 For example, it would not be profita-
ble to apply Habermas's formula to government regulation of abor-
tion, an issue on which it is highly unlikely that all possibly affected 
persons could assent to the regulation as participants in rational dis-
course.16 Dialogic, intersubjective communication may work for 
certain issues, but the issues most threatening to social unity - one 
of Habermas's overriding concerns - must be resolved by repre-
sentatives who are required to take a leap from the dialogue toward 
a particular decision. Even when communication results in an un-
derstanding among all those participating in the discourse, there is 
no requirement that the resultant "understanding" be equivalent to 
agreement. Moreover, even if all interested speakers were to come 
to substantive agreement through meaningful intersubjective dis-
course, the agreement would not have societal force without the 
action of a designated decisionmaking 1;>ody. Habermas has articu-
lated a persuasive portrait of discourse in the public sphere in the 
sense that he has attempted to break down the unwarranted belief 
that there is an unbridgeable divide between the spheres of private 
74. Id. at ch. 8, p. 60. 
75. See Rosenfeld, supra note 67, at 1176-79. 
76. Id. 
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and public discourse. He has failed, however, to grapple ade-
quately with the degree of decisionism necessary in any democratic 
government. 
Even when the people as a whole effectively mobilize and pre-
vail upon their elected representatives to follow a particular path, 
those representatives retain the power to make a decision at odds 
with the people. Their contrary decision is legitimate, even though 
it may fail as a matter of good judgment. In the face of public pres-
sure, the legislative result is more likely to reflect the consensus 
than not, but there is still no identity between the views expressed 
by the public movement and the ultimate governing decision or be-
tween the addressees and the authors. In fact, mobilization by the 
public does not necessarily prove that its decision is superior to a 
contrary decision by its elected representatives. Only history, per-
spective, and judgment can make that call. 
There is a gap between discourse, even prevalent popular dis-
course, and governmental decisionmaking that cannot be bridged 
by further discourse. It can only be bridged by increasing the deci-
sionmaking power of citizens, a suggestion that Habermas does not 
pursue, and decreasing the decisionmaking power of the represen-
tative. No matter how one analyzes a society's dialogic, intersubjec-
tive process, twentieth-century philosophy has yet to explain away 
or to transcend the essentially Hobbesian point that government 
requires decision.11 
It is most difficult for Habermas to swallow the necessary core 
of arbitrariness at the heart of representative democracy. James 
Wiison understood it and accordingly called for as many means as 
possible to keep the legislator tied to his constituents. Happily, 
Schoenbrod's theory reintroduces this fixed aspect of representa-
tive democracy into the discourse on republican democracy. He 
does not suggest that we increase citizen involvement in the com-
plex decisions of governing the state, either through the courts or 
legislative reform. Nor does he suggest that we test the decisions 
reached by representatives according to an ideal state of discourse. 
Rather, he advocates a renewed regime wherein representatives 
take upon themselves this burden of arbitrariness. He advocates 
not decisionism per se, but the decisionism most clearly envisioned 
by Wilson, a decisionism fenced in by accountability and the core 
democratic value of liberty. 
As democratic as Habermas's formula may sound, it is a 
formula that cannot justify or explain rights of individual liberty. 
For Habermas, the decision is acceptable on democratic grounds so 
long as the people would have assented to it. When Habermas 
77. See David Dyzenhaus, "Now the Machine Runs Itself": Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and 
Ke/sen, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 5-10 {1994) (discussing Hobbes's theory of public order). 
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closes the gap between government and its citizens by making a 
perpetual loop between law's addressees and its authors, he reduces 
and transforms rights of individual liberty, which protect against 
bad or poorly reached government decisions, into rights of partici-
pation or authorship. For Schoenbrod - and myself - a legisla-
tive decision should stand only if the government reached the 
decision in an appropriate way and if it does not tread into rights-
territory, defined by the Bill of Rights. It is only the gap between 
the discursive public sphere and its representatives that justifies a 
system of fundamental rights. 
For James Madison, rights were necessary to protect the minor-
ity from the majority.7B Madison's presupposition that representa-
tives' decisions would reflect majority preferences was the first step 
down the slippery slope toward misconstruing representation as 
self-rule.79 Habermas slides all the way down the slope as he argues 
for inclusive public discourse so that minority interests will be au-
thors of the law as well as its addressees. He uses universal inclu-
siveness to justify his willingness to judge all laws solely according 
to procedural standards.Bo Madison and Habermas, however, over-
emphasize the majority-minority or insider-outsider distinction in a 
republican democracy. The fact of the representatives' decision-
making independence makes it necessary to protect all combina-
tions of the people - whether individual or grouped in minorities 
or majorities - against potential tyranny. Even when all of the 
people have joined together to support a particular cause, contrary 
legislative decisions are constitutionally legitimate. Thus, substan-
tive rights are necessary to protect the people from their represent-
atives. The lacuna between the representative and the represented 
that motivated James Wilson's many contributions to the framing of 
the American system of representative democracy, underlies 
Schoenbrod's conclusions, and deserves further, careful study. 
Finally, the same reasons that make direct lawmaking unattrac-
tive also make Habermas's formula unattractive.Bi The individual 
acting without constitutional safeguards and acting only on behalf 
of herself is less likely to operate in the public's interest than a rep-
resentative explicitly charged with the public's trust and cabined by 
constitutional structures.82 The role adopted by those who must 
"assent" - an issue not addressed by Habermas - determines in 
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
79. Wilson saw more clearly the independence of representatives during the term of rep-
resentation, even from majorities. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 532-34. Mancur Olson has 
reinforced the insight that majorities do not readily capture legislative decisionmaking. 
MANcuR OLSON, THE Lome OF CoLLECTIVE AcnoN (2d ed. 1971). 
80. See Habermas, supra note 21, at postscript, pp. 2-4. 
81. See supra Part II. 
82. See Eule, supra note 12. 
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large degree whether the assent is acceptable. If the role is deter-
minative, then Habermas's discourse theory is decidedly less help-
ful in crafting a theory of a legitimate representative democracy 
than is Schoenbrod's nascent elaboration of the duties of the demo-
cratic representative. 
CONCLUSION 
If the contemporary debate over democracy is any indication, 
representative democracy faces a crisis. No one defends the system 
as it now stands. 1\vo choices are becoming increasingly apparent: 
take the representative system back to first principles with the hope 
that the liberty-endangering tendencies of the administrative state 
can be reversed, which is Schoenbrod's prescription; or bid its pre-
eminence farewell, accede to the permanence of the administrative 
state as it exists, and attempt to transform representation into direct 
lawmaking. This is Habermas's approach. At the heart of the con-
troversy over the diagnosis and cure to be assigned to legislative 
representation, lies the siren song of public self-rule. That concept, 
rejected as an acceptable model for American government by the 
Framers but valued nonetheless in limited circumstances, has 
gained converts over the intervening two hundred years until now it 
threatens to undermine the concept of representation altogether.s3 
David Schoenbrod's book, Power Without Responsibility, takes an 
important step in broadening the debate over the representative 
system. By posing the problem in terms of legislative responsibility 
and capacity rather than citizen self-rule, he expands the discourse 
by reintroducing the fundamental insight that led the Framers to 
endorse a republican form of democracy rather than a direct de-
mocracy: for government to be efficient and effective, power must 
be delegated to a body of capable individuals entrusted to make 
independent decisions for the whole. The course of representative 
democracy depends on securing - or recalling - a philosophical 
justification for the gap in power between representative and repre-
sented that can overcome the intuitive appeal of self-rule. 
83. See generally Hamilton, supra note 1. 
